Most theories and models of memory are based on two assumptions that contain theoretical problems. These problems are reflected in the memory-trace paradox, which consists in believing that the past is contained in the memory trace, and in the fallacy of the homunculus, which consists in assuming the existence of an unconscious intentional subject. We will discuss these and present an alternative hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality. This holds that consciousness is not a unitary dimension, but (...) is the set of distinct and original modes to address the object. Among the modes of consciousness, a distinction is made between Knowing Consciousness (KC) and Temporal Consciousness (TC). KC describes the mode of addressing the object in order to know it. TC describes the mode of consciousness that temporalizes its object according the subordinate structures of temporality, the past, the present and the future. Finally it is shown how the hypothesis accounts for a variety of memory disorders and phenomena while avoiding the memory- trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus. (shrink)

Is mental imagery pictorial? In Pylyshyn's view no empirical data provides convincing support to the “pictorial” hypothesis of mental imagery. Phenomenology, Pylyshyn says, is deeply deceiving and offers no explanation of why and how mental imagery occurs. We suggest that Pylyshyn mistakes phenomenology for what it never pretended to be. Phenomenological evidence, if properly considered, shows that mental imagery may indeed be pictorial, though not in the way that mimics visual perception. Moreover, Pylyshyn claims that the “pictorial hypothesis” is flawed (...) because the interpretation of “picture-like” objects in mental imagery takes a homunculus. However, the same point can be objected to Pylyshyn's own conclusion: if imagistic reasoning involves the same mechanisms and the same forms of representation as those that are involved in general reasoning, if they operate on symbol-based representations of the kind recommended by Pylyshyn (1984) and Fodor (1975), don't we need a phenomenological homunculus to tell an imagined bear from the real one? (shrink)

In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.

RIASSUNTO: Il presente studio sui presupposti imprescindibili di ogni etica personalistica si propone di confutare e di superare una volta per sempre il relativismo, l’utilitarismo e il fondamentale scetticismo delle etiche contemporanee, fondate sull’assolutizzazione dei fatti, del costume, delle tendenze culturali storicamente e socialmente prevalenti nella nostra epoca presente. Tale atteggiamento è tollerante e pluralista soltanto in apparenza, perché nella realtà è ipocritamente intollerante verso ogni altra etica che non sia quella dell’edonismo ordinario, del consumismo e dell’acquiescenza alle richieste della (...) tecnica ed agli imperativi della ricerca scientifica rivolta unicamente a fini di utilità e di conquista di comodità e di agevolazioni per il genere umano. L’etica che intendiamo proporre è incentrata sull’idea di “persona”; secondo il nostro modo di vedere la persona è apertura assoluta verso il tutto dell’essere ed è eminentemente attualità spirituale. Non lo è perciò unicamente un’attività razionale universale, ma coinvolge fondamentalmente anche l’emotività, la volontà e il desiderio. Secondo noi l’esigenza fondamentale della persona spirituale è la ricerca della felicità, e tale ricerca si impone con la cogenza di un vero e proprio “imperativo etico”, e la sua funzione è quella di liberarci dalle costrizioni del costume, della falsa e artificiale morale corrente ordinaria che si assoggetta soltanto ai fatti e alla ricerca dell’utile e del conveniente. Liberazione e imperatività sono gli elementi essenziali per la ricerca della felicità, e questa a sua volta consiste nella promozione di un crescente accordo e di una sicura armonia di ogni persona con se stessa. L’imperatività dell’obbligazione con la quale ci leghiamo fedelmente all’impegno squisitamente spirituale di affermare la nostra libertà dalla servitù dei fatti e dall’attaccamento a ciò che è soltanto provvisorio e povero di autentica soddisfazione interiore conferma e promuove la liberazione spirituale in ogni persona. PAROLE CHIAVI: Persona. Etica personalista. Utilitarismo. Imperativo etico. RESUMO: O presente estudo pretende refutar e superar definitivamente o relativismo, o utilitarismo e o ceticismo fundamental das éticas contemporâneas, fudamentadas na absolutização dos fatos, do costume, das tendências culturais historicamente e socialmente dominantes na época presente. Tal atitude é tolerante e pluralista somente na aparência, porque na realidade é hipocritamente intolerante a qualquer outra ética que não seja a do hedonismo ordinário, do consumismo e da aquiescência às demandas da técnica e aos imperativos da pesquisa científica dirigida unicamente aos fins da utilidade e da conquista do bem-estar e de facilitações para o gênero humano. A ética que pretendemos propor está centrada na ideia de pessoa. Na nossa opinião, a pessoa é abertura absoluta para o todo do ser e é eminentemente atualidade espiritual. Não é, portanto, unicamente uma atividade racional universal, mas envolve fundamentalmente também a emotividade, a vontade e o desejo. A exigência fundamental da pessoa espiritual é a busca da felicidade. E tal busca se impõe com a força de um verdadeiro e próprio “imperativo ético”. E a sua função é a de nos libertar das constrições do hábito, da falsa e artificial moral ordinária que se submete somente aos fatos e à busca do útil e do conveniente. Libertação e imperatividade são os elementos essenciais para a busca da felicidade e esta, por sua vez, consiste na promoção de um crescente acordo e de uma harmonia sólida de cada pessoa consigo mesma. A imperatividade da obrigação com a qual nos ligamos fielmente ao compromisso espiritual de afirmar a nossa libertade da escravidão dos fatos e do apego àquilo que é somente provisório e pobre de autêntica satisfação interior confirma e promove a libertação espiritual de cada pessoa. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Pessoa. Ética personalista. Utilitarismo. Imperativo ético. (shrink)

Se l'attenzione maggiore degli studiosi si è da sempre concentrata sulle Dionisiache, non di meno negli ultimi vent'anni si assiste a un rinnovato interesse per l'altro poema esametrico attribuito a Nonno, la Parafrasi del Vangelo di Giovanni; ciò soprattutto per merito di Enrico Livrea e della sua scuola fiorentina, di cui anche l'autore di questo volume fa parte. Esso rappresenta una tappa ulteriore – dopo l'edizione del Canto I (De Stefani), del Canto II (Livrea), del Canto XVIII (Livrea) e del (...) Canto XX (Accorinti) – in quello che si annuncia come un progetto di edizione critica commentata di tutti canti del poema sacro nonniano: progetto certamente ambizioso ma indispensabile per fare luce piena su un momento fondamentale dell'epica tardoantica. Diversamente dalla poesia centonaria, Nonno, pur seguendo dappresso la Vorlage evangelica, volle fare opera in qualche misura originale e ci riuscì, pur con uno stile che non si potrebbe immaginare più contrastante rispetto alla austera sobrietà del dettato giovanneo. Il volume di Agosti, sostenuto da una ricchissima e pressocché completa bibliografia, si apre con una Introduzione assai ampia e decisamente pregevole per la capacità dimostrata dallo studioso di inquadrare il poema nonniano nell'ambito vasto dell'epica tardoantica non solo greca ma anche latina: da questo punto di vista illuminanti appaiono i raffronti con Giovenco, Aratore, Claudiano, Prudenzio, Commodiano, oltre che, naturalmente, con Gregorio Nazianzeno, Eudocia e gli Homerocentones. Convinto che il Nonno parafraste sia il medesimo autore delle Dionisiache, Agosti ritiene decisamente superata la tesi contraria, e intelligentemente si limita a rilevare la straordinaria affinità fra i due poemi non solo a livello stilistico, linguistico e metrico, ma anche – aspetto forse ancora più sorprendente – sotto il profilo concettuale: «Vi sono elementi di chiaro influsso cristiano nelle D. e d'altra parte la figura di Cristo tende ad assumere alcuni tratti bacchici nella P.» (p. 46). Una tesi, questa, che viene corroborata con numerosi raffronti puntuali nelle dense note di commento. Essendo gran parte del Canto Quinto, corrispondente al quinto capitolo del vangelo giovanneo, dedicato al miracolo del paralitico guarito nella piscina di Bethesda, viene affrontato il problema dello spazio dedicato ai miracoli di guarigione nel mondo pagano e cristiano del V secolo, in particolare nell'ambiente egizio dove Nonno visse e operò (ma molto cauto si mostra, a mio avviso saggiamente, l'Autore nei confronti di identificazioni troppo incerte, come quella che vorrebbe Nonno vescovo di Edessa). Il lettore deduce dalle sue considerazioni come nulla di sorprendente o di aberrante l'uomo tardoantico potesse scorgere nel racconto di Giovanni, che anzi non discorda da analoghe imprese attribuite ad Asclepio, il dio guaritore ϰατεξοχήν, ma anche a taumaturghi come Apollonio di Tiana: si trattava, se mai, di una sorta di concorrenza fra Cristo e i suoi omologhi e rivali pagani. Allo stesso modo, Agosti pensa che il pubblico della Parafrasi e quello delle Dionisiache fosse in sostanza il medesimo, forse con una percentuale cristiana maggiore nel primo caso e minore nel secondo. Ovviamente si rimane nel campo delle ipotesi, ma certo il sincretismo del tempo poteva forse spingersi tanto avanti da giustificare simile osmosi, anche se appare lecito dubitare che cristiani convinti giungessero a tollerare l'incredibile ampiezza del poema a gloria di Dioniso, e, viceversa, che a un pubblico pagano potesse veramente interessare il vangelo di Giovanni – di cui per altro Agosti segnala qualche risonanza in ambiente neoplatonico. Meritorie appaiono anche le osservazioni sul retroterra esegetico del poema sacro, «più vicino all'esegesi che alla parafrasi stricto sensu» (p. 111), con particolare riferimento al commento giovanneo di Cirillo d'Alessandria: una consonanza del resto già osservata da altri studiosi della Parafrasi. Nelle note l'Autore cita numerosi passi da Cirillo, non nascondendosi comunque la notevole libertà con cui Nonno – il cui intento primario non dovette certo essere teologico – se ne servì. Non meno interessanti le considerazioni su alcuni punti di contatto con la liturgia, tema di cui Agosti segnala la non secondaria importanza per una valutazione corretta e completa dell'epica cristiana. (shrink)

v. 1. El tiempo histórico de Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba -- v. 2. Generaciones y mentalidades. Estudios de teoría de la Historia.

§1. Introduction. The problem raised by the liar paradox has long been an intriguing challenge for all those interested in the concept of truth. Many “solutions” have been proposed to solve or avoid the paradox, either prescribing some linguistical restriction, or giving up the classical true-false bivalence or assuming some kind of contextual dependence of truth, among other possibilities. We shall not discuss these different approaches to the subject in this paper, but we shall concentrate on a kind of formal (...) construction which was originated by Kripke's paper “Outline of a theory of truth” [11] and which, in different forms, reappears in later papers by various authors.The main idea can be presented as follows: assume a first order language ℒ containing, among other unspecified symbols, a predicate symbolTintended to represent the truth predicate for ℒ. Assume, also, a fixed modelM= 〈D, I〉 whereDcontains all sentences of ℒ andIinterprets all non-logical symbols of ℒ exceptTin the usual way. In general,Dmight contain many objects other than sentences of ℒ but as that would raise the problem of the meaning of sentences in whichTis applied to one of these objects, we shall assume that this is not the case. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to address the problem of the philosophical method, which consists of the lack of consensus among philosophers regarding the proper procedure to carry out this human activity. In this sense, it examines a few methodological proposals put forward by some representatives of contemporary philosophy, emphasizing the impact that the development of modern science has had on such views. In addition, the plausibility of such proposals is assessed.

In this paper it is explored the relationship between the practice of philosophy and the development of a sort of professional intuition through it. That is to say, this paper is broadly concerned with a very traditional metaphilosophical topic, namely, the sort of abilities a skillful philosopher must possess to excel at philosophizing. More precisely, it critically examines the long-held common place in philosophy according to which the competences acquired through philosophical training are related to applying concepts. Such a view (...) has given way to the idea that philosophers gain expert intuitions -provided by philosophical training- about using concepts. In this sense, it has been shown in experimental philosophy that philosophers holding this notion of the practice of philosophy might be under the illusion of expertise. For these reasons, we argue, based on the work of the psychologist Deanna Kuhn, that philosophical expertise, on a more positive account, might be related to the evaluation, construction, and rebuttal of arguments. With this in mind, we also explore the relationship between intuition and arguments in philosophy. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo examinar críticamente la discusión en torno a la identidad nacional panameña denominado el problema de lo panameño, particularmente aquellas perspectivas propuestas por filósofos profesionales, así como determinar su alcance y revisitar sus presupuestos. Con ello en mente, intentaremos contextualizar hasta donde sea posible dicha discusión, buscando poner de relieve los factores históricos que la motivan, además de evaluar la vigencia de esta.

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo principal examinar y determinar las consecuencias de las metáforas contenidas en las obras de Diego Domínguez Caballero, fundador de la filosofía académica panameña. Tales metáforas se volvieron fundamentales para el desarrollo discursivo de la filosofía panameña y también para las ciencias sociales en el país, como la historia y la sociología. Con este fin, recurriremos a la teoría de las metáforas conceptuales desarrollada por Lakoff y otros como una herramienta de ayuda para analizar las que (...) Domínguez emplea. Del mismo modo, intentamos dar cuenta de la larga incidencia discursiva de dichas metáforas a la luz de los resultados de la investigación psicológica sobre el esencialismo. -/- The main objective of this work is to examine and determine the consequences of the metaphors contained in the works of Diego Domínguez Caballero, founder of Panamanian academic philosophy. Such metaphors became fundamental for the discursive development of Panamanian philosophy and also for the social sciences in this country, as history and sociology. To this end, we will turn to the theory of conceptual metaphors developed by Lakoff and others as a helpful tool in analyzing the ones used by Domínguez. In the same way, we try to account for the long discursive incidence of these metaphors in the light of the results of psychological research on essentialism. (shrink)

This paper mainly addresses the relation between essentialism and philosophical method. In particular, our analysis centers on the anti-essentialist argument that proposed, given its essentialist bonds, the abandonment of the notion of method. To this end, we make use of the empirical evidence concerning essentialism provided by psychological research, which has shown that our proneness to essentialize is not a by-product of our social and cultural practices as some anti-essentialists have thought. Rather, it is a deeply rooted cognitive tendency that (...) plays a major role in concept formation and so in our understanding of things. Thus, given that such inclination toward essentialism is certain to happen, we argue for a conception of method that, while not overcoming such tendency, avoids the presumed disastrous consequences feared by most anti-essentialists. (shrink)

While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

This paper aims to argue for two related statements: first, that formal semantics should not be conceived of as interpreting natural language expressions in a single model (a very large one representing the world as a whole, or something like that) but as interpreting them in many different models (formal counterparts, say, of little fragments of reality); second, that accepting such a conception of formal semantics yields a better comprehension of the relation between semantics and pragmatics and of the role (...) to be played by formal semantics in the general enterprise of understanding meaning. For this purpose, three kinds of arguments are given: firstly, empirical arguments showing that the many models approach is the most straightforward and natural way of giving a formal counterpart to natural language sentences. Secondly, logical arguments proving the logical impossibility of a single universal model. And thirdly, theoretical arguments to the effect that such a conception of formal semantics fits in a natural and fruitful way with pragmatic theories and facts. In passing, this conception will be shown to cast some new light on the old problems raised by liar and sorites paradoxes. (shrink)

The author means to show how focusing on the sense of hearing can sharpen our understanding of Kierkegaard’s argument – in the first portion of Either/Or – that Don Giovanni ranks supreme among works of art. After explaining how he takes Kierkegaard’s case to rest on the issue of the ear being the “most spiritually qualified sense,” he shows how attending to the importance of hearing within the original Don Juan myth, as well as within Mozart and Da Ponte’s treatment (...) of it, can help us understand the myth’s dependence on and repudiation of Christianity: unlike sight, hearing places us in close spiritual intimacy with its source, even as it also opens up specific possibilities of theatricality and deceit. He concludes by arguing why hearing should be regarded as the paradigmatic sense in relation to which Kierkegaard understands the task of philosophy itself, in contrast to earlier philosophical emphases on visible intelligibility. (shrink)

Such love, though it expends itself in generosity and thoughtfulness, though it give birth to visions and to great poetry, remains among the sharpest expressions of self-interest. Not until it has passed through a long servitude, through its own self-hatred, through mockery, through great doubts, can it take its place among the loyalties.most readers will be at least generally familiar with the details of Hegel’s so-called struggle for recognition, his account of the emergence of communal life in chapter 4 of (...) the Phenomenology of Spirit. “Consciousness,” the argument’s protagonist, at a certain stage interprets its desire for wisdom as a desire for the regard of another; it first tries to secure it by forcing the.. (shrink)

La pregunta ¿por qué enseñar el Holocausto? ha recibido diversas respuestas, que incluyen la comprensión de su contexto, naturaleza, propósito y el fomento de la diversidad en sociedades plurales. A pesar de su reconocimiento curricular y valor educativo, la producción investigadora en la región hispanoamericana y en España parece limitada. Desde la pedagogía de los traumas colectivos, el presente estudio busca realizar una revisión sistemática de la literatura de las contribuciones más recientes a la enseñanza del Holocausto, procedentes de los (...) países que definen ambos contextos geográficos. A partir de la aplicación de las directrices PRISMA,los resultados obtenidos dan cuenta del relegamiento de la educación para una ciudadanía democrática y en Derechos Humanos a una intención didáctica en el tratamiento de la enseñanza del Holocausto como tema controvertido. (shrink)

A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...) luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value. (shrink)

Título: Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales y Competencia Digital Docente en Educación Infantil. Autor: Delfín Ortega-Sánchez Edición: Narcea Lugar de publicación: Madrid Año: 2022 Idioma: Castellano ISBN: 978-84-277-2897-4 Páginas: 93.

The purpose of this paper is to expand the theoretical field of discursive injustice by identifying a specific kind of discursive injustice, namely, the kind we are subject to when we are unjustly prevented from exchanging reasons with others. Broadly speaking, discursive injustice is the kind of injustice we suffer when we are unjustly harmed as language users, most notably when we are prevented from using language in ways we are entitled to. The dominant approach to discursive injustice has focused (...) on the corruption of the illocutionary force of a speech act due to the hearer’s improper uptake. I claim that there is a genuinely distinct kind of discursive injustice, which I label as deliberative injustice, that cannot be accounted for by the dominant approach to discursive injustice. In my view, what makes deliberative injustice discursively unjust is that it amounts to denying someone a normative position that she is entitled to as a language user, which I understand in terms of being a source of reasons. Moreover, I explore two ways of trying to illuminate deliberative injustice by appealing to the social level of analysis, namely, by resorting to a structural explanation to explain how it comes about, and by asking what it signifies for the collective life of groups. In this regard, I show that the structural explanation has some explanatory limitations, and that deliberative injustice essentially constitutes a collective failure. (shrink)

En su libro Sustainable Knowledge: A Theory of Interdisciplinarity, Robert Frodeman señaló que «ahora más que nunca la filosofía es tan necesaria en nuestra vida y, sin embargo, ella nunca ha estado tan lejos de la sociedad; nunca la filosofía ha estado tan marginada». Guardando toda proporción, no deberíamos soslayar esta afirmación que pone en cuestión a la filosofía en el siglo XXI. Lo anterior se puede justificar, al menos, por dos razones: primera, la empresarización de la universidad ha disuelto (...) el trabajo colegiado, situación que dificulta la realización de proyectos conjuntos para hacer frente a los nuevos retos que surgen en la sociedad; segunda, una práctica e investigación filosófica endogámica. Para explicar esta lejanía de la filosofía, así como para replantear una orientación de ella, nosotros proponemos cuatro tesis: primera, una lectura empresarial y psicopolítica de las prácticas filosóficas; segunda, un replanteamiento de lo que es un problema filosófico; tercera, un replanteamiento de las actividades filosóficas; y, cuarta, la orientación de la investigación y las prácticas filosóficas a los cánones de las nuevas formas de producción del conocimiento. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans ses écrits de Jena, Fichte tente de résoudre l’apparent conflit entre la nécessité de faire reposer la philosophie sur des principes scientifiques et celle de respecter sa nature de vocation autonome. Ce faisant, il a prétendu accomplir d’autres tâches, sur les plans métaphilosophique, pédagogique et polémique : justifier les questions qui l’occupaient, communiquer sa pensée correctement et répondre aux incompréhensions de ses adversaires. Cet article montre qu’à travers ces considérations, Fichte s’essaie aussi au problème plus vaste qui consiste à (...) préciser la relation entre la «lettre» de la philosophie comme doctrine et son «esprit» intersubjectif. (shrink)

La risa caníbal -- Chaplin vs. Hitler : un estudio sobre la parodia -- En el interior de <> -- Sobre el chiste como una de las bellas artes -- La vida privada de los cómicos -- De muñecos y hombres -- El pensamiento cínico o el arte de la performance -- George Bush, o el payaso involuntario -- Prohibir la risa : el 11 de septiembre y la comunidad herida -- El político humorista, el humorista encarcelado: psoverdad, política (...) y humor -- Hombres que se ríen de los dioses -- <> feminista: el caballo en la ciudad sitiada -- Agradecimientos. (shrink)

One of the lasting influences of German Idealism has been the transformation of aesthetics into a central philosophical concern. My aim here is to show how and why Kant’s and Schiller’s formulations of the problems of moral agency, in particular, constitute an important episode of this development. I argue, first, that it is in the context of Kant’s view of moral agency that aesthetics gains larger purchase than it formerly had (as a response to the problem of the identification of (...) an agent with his external action); second, that Schiller expands the role of aesthetics (in response to Kant’s formulation of it) by intensifying a demand for aesthetic abandon in the agent as a bulwark against the threat of its possible “theatricalization.” It is these heightened demands on the first-personal content of agency that thus began the process of transforming the question of moral agency into an aesthetic one. (shrink)